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STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree entered on the
7th day of December, 1987, together with an appeal from the Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial entered on the 25th day
of February, 1988. The appeal is taken from the First Circuit
Court, Box Elder County, Brigham City Department.

This court has

jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-4-11 (as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court error in not dismissing plaintiff's

STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING CASE

70A-1-20L General definitions. Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters of this act which are applicable to specific chapters or parts thereof, and unless the context otherwise requires,
in this act: • . .
(3)

u

Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance
as provided in this act (sections 70A-1 205 ^nd 70A-2-208). Whether
an agreement has legal consequences is determined by the provisions of this act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts
(section 70A-1 103). (Compare "Contract.") . • •

(19) "Good faith" means honesty iji fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned. . . .

(37) "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The
retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (section 70A-2-401) is limited
in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." The term also
includes any interest of a buyer of account or chattel paper which
is subject to chapter 9. The special property interest of a buyer of
goods on identification of such goods to a contract for sale under
section 70A-2-401 is not a "security interest," but a buyer may also
acquire a "security interest" by complying with chapter 9. Unless
a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title
thereunder is not a "security interest" but a consignment is in any
event subject to the provisions on consignment sales (section
70A-2-326K Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an
option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended
for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to
become the owner of the property for no additional consideration
or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended
for security.
2

70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith. Every contract or duty within
this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.

70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way
of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or
by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing. . . .

(3)

A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection
(1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable . . .
(b)

if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under
this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or . . .

70A-9-105. Definitions and index of definitions.
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires: . . .
(1)

"Security agreement" means an agreement which creates or
provides for a security interest;
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70A-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers
both real and personal property.
(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured
party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except
as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agreement. He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure. If
the collateral is documents the secured party may proceed either
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. A secured
party in possession has the rights, remedies and duties provided
in section 70A-9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this
subsection are cumulative.
(2) After default, the debtor has the rights and remedies provided in
this part, those provided in the security agreement and those provided in section 70A-9-2Q7.
(3)

(4)

(5)

To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties
on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with
respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) of
section 70A-9-504 and section 70A-9-505) and with respect to
redemption of collateral (section 70A-9-506) but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of
these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable:
(a)
subsection (2) of section 70A-9-502 and subsection (2) of
section 70A-9-5Q4 in so far as they require accounting for
surplus proceeds of collateral;
(b)
subsection (3) of section 70A-9-504 and subsection (1) of
section 70A-9-505 which deal with disposition of collateral;
(c)
subsection (2) of section 70A-9-505 which deals with acceptance of collateral as discharge of obligation;
(d)
section 70A-9-506 which deals with redemption of collateral;
and
(e)
subsection (1) of section 70A-9-507 which deals with the
secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part.
If the security agreement covers both real and personal property,
the secured party may proceed under this part as to the personal
property or he may proceed as to both the real and the personal
property in accordance with his rights and remedies in respect of
the real property in which case the provisions of this part do not
apply.
When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the lien
of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate back to the
date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral. A
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of the
security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of this
section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this
chapter.
4

70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default.
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or
otherwise.

78-4-H. Appeal to Court of Appeals — County attorneys
to represent state, city attorneys to represent municipalities.
Except as otherwise directed by § 78-2-2, appeals from final civil and criminal judgments of the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. The county
attorney shall represent the interests of the state as public prosecutor in any
criminal appeals from the circuit court. City attorneys shall represent the
interests of municipalities in any appeals from circuit courts involving violations of municipal ordinances.

5

Rule 3. Commencement of action^
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint
with the court, or (2) by the service of a summons. If the action is commenced
by the service of a summons, the complaint, together with the summons and
proof of service thereof, must be filed within ten days after such service and a
copy of the complaint shall be served upon or mailed to the defendant if his
address is known; if unknown, a copy must be deposited with the clerk for
him, or the action thus commenced shall be deemed dismissed and the court
shall have no further jurisdiction thereof; provided, however, that the foregoing provision shall not change the requirement of § 12-1-8. Utah Code Annotated 1953.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.

m
*

*i

(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a *hew trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any'of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions^
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
-(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
|
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
|
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant
alleging that on the 7th day of June 1986 the defendant sold to
the plaintiff certain farm equipment.

The plaintiff alleged that

he paid for the equipment the sum of $5,500.00, but the defendant
failed to deliver the equipment, and the plaintiff was therefore
damaged in the amount of $5,500.00. (R.l).

The defendant filed a

general answer denying that the defendant was indebted to the
plaintiff in any amount, and alleging that the plaintiff owed
$4,500.00 to the defendant under their contract.

(R.3-4)

On June 6, 1986, Carl Baker came to Dale Barnes1 equipment
yard in Tremonton Utah, seeking to purchase certain farm
equipment.

He came after 5:00 o'clock, after the defendant's

business office was closed.

(T.12).

Mr. Baker was interested in

purchasing an International Harvester tractor, Model 706. He
drove the tractor around the area (T.13) and also determined to
buy a pair of John Deere Twin Rakes, Model 270 and 271, with rake
cart.
He agreed to pay the price of $10,000.00 for the equipment
he purchased.

(T.14)

Mr. Baker and Mr. Barnes agreed that Mr. Baker would trade
in a Heston swather 12 foot and an International Harvester side
rake, and that he would be given a trade-in value of $5,500.00
for the equipment traded in.

(Exhibit 4)
7

8
LAW

J

£ *

OFFICES

MANN, HADFIELD AND

THORNE

OCT 3 1988

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

REED W. HADFIELD
JEFF R. THORNE
BEN H. HADFIELD

ZIONS
9 8

BANK
NORTH

WALTER G. hMANN, RETIRED

BUILDING

COURT OF APPEALS

MAIN

P. O . B O X " F "
BRIGHAM

CITY, UTAH 8 4 - 3 0 2 - 0 9 0 6
(801) 723-34-04-

September 29, 1988
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Carl Baker vs. Dale Barnes dba Barnes Equipment
No. 880176-CA

Gentlemen:
In reviewing the Appellant's Brief we discovered that we had
inadvertently placed the wrong names on two pages:
1. On page 8, the last paragraph, the third line from the
bottom, "Mr. Barnes" should be crossed out and "Mr. Baker" should
be inserted.
2. On page 9, line six, the word "Mr. Barnes" should be
crossed out and "Mr. Baker" should be inserted.
If it is possible to make those changes pursuant to this
letter, I would appreciate it. If not, I could stop in Salt Lake
and interlineate those changes.
Very truly you^b,
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

By.
JRT/tr
cc:

Arden Lauritzen

si

v ^

Mr. Barnes' equipment was subject to g. security interest at
Zions Bank which was flooring his inventory, (T.38)
Mr. Baker stated that he would obtain his own financing on
the equipment, as he was working with his own bank, Commercial
Security Bank, and would include this equipment in the financing
he was arranging and would pay the balance to Mr. Barnes.

(T.6)

The parties never had a written document specifying the
exact time in which the payment would be made, but Mr. Baker
agreed that he would obtain his own financing within a reasonable
time and pay Mr. Barnes within 60-90 days. (T.19).

Mr. Baker

further understood that interest normally begins 30 days after
purchase and he would be obligated to pay some interest on the
balance owed. (T.17)
Mr. Barnes intended to retain an interest in the property
until he was paid in full, and Mr. Baker understood that Mr.
Barnes was retaining an interest in the property until he was
paid.
During the summer of 1986, Mr. Barnes repeatedly attempted
to contact Mr. Baker to be paid, or to at least receive evidence
that financing was in place or worked upon.

Mr. Barnes1

testimony was that during the months of July, August and
September and October, that he tried to contact Mr. Barnes eight
or ten times in person and perhaps 30 or 40 times on the
telephone. (T.40).

On two separate occasions Mr. Barnes
8

contacted Mr, Baker and gave him credit applications to finance
the equipment through Zions Bank, (T.39)

Mr. Baker (apparently

without ever telling Mr. Barnes) disregarded the credit
applications because he claimed he was going to work through his
own bank, Commercial Security Bank. (T.61)
Mr. Barnes had the use of the equipment during the entire
crop growing season for the summer and fall of 1986. (T.26).
After numerous attempts to contact Mr. Baker to obtain his
money or at least obtain financing, Dale Barnes went to Cache
Valley and repossessed the items sold.

Mr. Barnes testified that

occurred on November 15, 1986, (T.44) and Mr. Baker testified
that it occurred on September 15, 1986. (T.55)

The trial court

found that the repossession occurred in September, 1986.
On May 6, 1987, Dale Barnes sent a letter to Carl Baker
informing him that if he would pay off the balance, he could have
the equipment returned. (Exhibit 1).

On May 8, 1987, Dale

Barnes sent a second letter to Carl Baker informing him that he
could still have the equipment if he would obtain financing and
pay the same off.

(Exhibit 2)

Mr. Baker indicates that he denied the offer to finance the
equipment and take the same because he had purchased another
tractor for his use, but he never replaced the rakes.
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(T.59)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The plaintiff's pleadings failed to give adequate

notice to the defendant that he was claiming a wrongful
repossession by the seller which rescinded the contract.

The

failure to give adequate notice in pleadings required that at the
completion of plaintiff's case, that the defendant's Motion to
Dismiss be granted.
2.

The agreement between the buyer and seller constituted

a security agreement, since the seller intended to retain an
interest in the property until he was paid in full.

The failure

of the buyer to obtain financing and pay the defendant within the
agreed 60 to 90 days constituted a default under their agreement,
and the seller was then entitled to repossess the equipment.
3.

The trial court abused its discretion by not granting

to the plaintiff a new trial because of surprise, newly
discovered evidence, and errors in law.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
FOLLOWING THE PLAINTIFF1S CASE.
The complaint (R.l-2) was filed on June 22, 1987 in the Circuit

10

Court, Box Elder County, Brigham City Department,1 and
the only substantive allegation in the complaint states:
"2. that on or about the 7th day of June,
1986 the Defendant sold to the Plaintiff
certain equipment more particularly described
as one International Harvester tractor model
706 and one pair of John Deere twin rakes
models 270 and 271 with cart. That Plaintiff
has paid toward the aforesaid described
equipment a total of $5500.00 but Defendant
has failed to deliver said equipment whereby
the Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount
of $5500.00 together with interest from and
after the 7th day of June 1986 at the rate of
12%." (R.l)
A General Answer was filed on June 23, 1987 denying that the
defendant owed any money to the plaintiff. (R.3-4).2 On the 8th
day of July, 1987 a Notice of Readiness for Trial (R.8-9) was
signed by A. W. Lauritzen, attorney for plaintiff.

No objection

to the Notice of Readiness was filed, since the defendant was
prepared to defend himself regarding the issue of "delivery of
equipment".

The defendant was served with a "Ten Day Summons" on May
28, 1987. No complaint was filed until June 22, 1987.
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3(a)
the court had no further jurisdiction and the action
should have been dismissed.
2

The plaintiff may argue that the defendant waived any right
to have the action dismissed by filing a general answer, but Rule
3(a) appears to be jurisdictional in so far as the requirement
that a complaint be filed within 10 days, see Bawden and
Associates v. Smith. 624 P.2d 676 (Utah 1981).
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No discovery was submitted by either party in the action.
On October 6, 1987 a "Notice of Trial Setting" (R.10) was hand
delivered to Jeff Thorne, attorney for the defendant, stating
that trial would be held on October 9, 1987.
At trial, the plaintiff freely admitted that the equipment
had in fact been delivered to him on or before June 17, 1986
(T.16).

The plaintiff never moved to amend his complaint, nor

was any notice given to defendant that would put the defendant on
notice that the plaintiff was claiming a wrongful repossession by
the seller.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the

defendant moved to dismiss the action (T.25,34).

The trial court

denied the motion (T.34).
The defendant with due diligence could not have known prior
to trial that the plaintiff's position was totally contrary to
his pleadings. At trial the plaintiff argued a totally different
theory of his case and claimed that the contract was rescinded by
the defendant, since the defendant wrongfully repossessed the
property.

(T.25-26).

The trial judge, (who appeared not to be

conversant with the commercial code), questioned whether the
agreement constituted a "conditional sales contract" and stated
that no "written" right to repossess was reserved.

(T.27,29).

Under the facts of this case it is clear that the
plaintiff's pleadings did not afford the defendant an adequate
opportunity to defend against a "claimed" wrongful repossession.
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The trial court should have dismissed plaintifffs cause of
action.

See Taylor v E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d

279 (1953).
POINT II
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BAKER AND
BARNES WAS A SECURITY AGREEMENT AND
BARNES WAS ENTITLED TO REPOSSESS
THE EQUIPMENT WHEN BAKER FAILED TO
MAKE PAYMENTS.
A.

Security Agreement.

Barnes sold Baker farm equipment, which after trade-in
allowances, left Baker owing Barnes $4,500. (T.5).

Baker knew

and agreed that Barnes was retaining an interest in the equipment
until Barnes was paid.

(T.14,16).

Mr. Baker agreed to get his

own financing and pay Mr. Barnes within 60 to 90 days (T.19).
The Uniform Commercial Code is extremely liberal regarding
the formal requirements as to what constitutes a "security
agreement".

The reasons for this are that the drafters of the

Uniform Commercial Code recognized that in actual business
transactions, buyers and sellers often fail to get complete
written documents signed, and the drafters felt that it would be
unfair to penalize a party because he did not have a complete
written document, see Anderson on Uniform Commercial Code, Vol.
1, under §2-201, official code comment.
UTAH CODE ANNO. § 70A-9-105(1)(1) states:
"Security Agreement" means aa agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest".
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"Agreement11 is a defined term under the Commercial Code.
Section 70A-1-201(3) states:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties
in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances
including course of dealing or usage of trade
or course of performance as provided in this
act (sections 70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208).
Whether an agreement has legal consequences
is determined by the provisions of this act,
if applicable; otherwise by the law of
contracts (section 70A-1-103). (Compare
"Contract").
Thus an "agreement" is basically the parties "bargain".
"Security interest" is also defined a term.

UTAH CODE ANNO.

70A-1-201(37) states:
"Security interest" means an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation...."
From the evidence it is clear that the parties intended that
Dale Barnes would retain an interest in the property until he was
paid in full,3 and thus, a security agreement existed and the
parties rights are governed by the Utah Commercial Code.
B.

Legal Contract.

The statute of frauds provisions of tne Utah Commercial
Code, see UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-2-201(1) provides for minimal

The evidence includes: Exhibit A, the sales invoice; Mr.
Baker's testimony found at: (T.6 1.17-20) (T.7 1.18-22)
(T.8 1.1-3) (T.14 1.21-24) (T.16,17) (T.19,1.18-24)

14

requirements to have an enforceable contract.

These minimum

legal requirements are:
(a)

A writing;

(b)

Signed by the party against who it is enforced;

(c)

A description of the collateral.

Exhibit A sets forth all formal requirements, except that it
is not signed by Mr. Baker.

However, UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-2-

201(3)(b) provides:
"A contract which does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable...(b)
if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleadings, testimony or
otherwise in court that a contract for sale
was made,..."
The formal requirements for a contract have clearly been met
inasmuch as plaintifffs Exhibit A evidences the agreement between
the parties; Carl Baker received the tractor and rakes and traded
in a swather and side rake and admitted that he owed Dales Barnes
$4,500.00.

Additionally Carl Baker admitted in his pleadings and

in his testimony that an agreement existed and Dale Barnes
claimed an interest in the equipment.

Therefore, there can be no

dispute that a "legal contract" and "security agrement" existed
between the plaintiff and defendant.
C.

Default

The testimony at court relating to time of payment can best
be summarized by saying at the time of purchase, Mr. Baker stated
15

he would arrange his own financing and Mr. Barnes was willing to
let him do it. The question then becomes, how long did Baker
have to get financing arranged?
By his own admission, Baker acknowledged that he recognized
he would have to pay the $4,500 within a reasonable time (T.17)
and that at the time of sale he told Mr. Barnes it would probably
take 60 to 90 days to get his financing.

{T.19 1.18-24).

Mr. Barnes testified he tried eight or ten times in vehicles
and probably "30 or 40 on the telephone" to get Baker to pay him
or finance the equipment.

(T.40).

Mr. Baker had the equipment the entire growing year of 1986
(T.23).

After waiting until at least September 15, 1986,4 Mr.

Baker repossessed the equipment.
By the evidence most favorable to Baker, after September 7,
1986 he was in default.
D.

Right to Repossess

UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-9-501 provides:

"(1) When a debtor is in default under a
security agreement, a secured party has the
rights and remedies provided in this part...
UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-9-503 states:
"Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has
on default the right to take possession of
4

There was conflicting testimony as to the time of
repossession. Mr. Baker said September 15, 1986, Mr.
Barnes said November 15, 1986. The trial court found
September 15, 1986 to be the date of repossession.

16

the collateral. In taking possession a
secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of
the peace or may proceed by action. If the
security agreement so provides the secured
party may require the debtor to assemble the
collateral and make it available to the
secured party at a place to be designated by
the secured party which is reasonably
convenient to both parties. Without removal
a secured party may render equipment unusable
and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's
premises under section 70A-9-504. If a
secured party elects to proceed by process of
law he may proceed by writ of replevin or
otherwise."
Barnes had the right to repossess the equipment upon
default.

see Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164

(1971).
After his equipment was repossessed, Baker knew Barnes had
picked up the equipment (T.62).

Mr. Barnes then sent two letters

to Baker advising him of the repossession (Ex. 1 and 2) and
allowing Baker to have the equipment by paying the agreed price.
The Uniform Commercial Code, UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-l-203 also
provides:
"Every contract or duty within this act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement.11
UTAH CODE ANNO. §70A-1-201(19) states:
"Good faith" means honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned."
It stretches one's sense of honesty to believe the buyer
could use the equipment all growing season, never arrange

17

financing, know it has been repossessed by the seller and be able
to get away with it.

The seller offered to allow the buyer to

complete the contract by paying the balance owed, but the buyer
refused and then sued to get the trade-in allowance from the
seller.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth
grounds for granting a new trial.

Clearly, on three of these

grounds a new trial was justified.

These three grounds are:

"...(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial....
(7) Error in law."
As was argued in Point 1 of appellant's brief, the plaintiff
claimed that the machinery was never "delivered", but at trial
claimed the plaintiff wrongfully repossessed the equipment and
thus rescinded the contract.

This clearly constituted surprise.

Because of the pleadings the defendant was unaware that the
question of when repossession took place was in dispute; also
because of the pleadings Barnes was unaware that the question of
whether Baker was actually seeking financing would be relevant.
Accordingly no testimony from Commercial Security Bank's, Harry
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Willmore, was obtained which would have stated that no actual
progress towards paying Mr. Barnes took place in the summer or
fall of 1986, and further to get additional proof showing
repossession took place in November 1986 instead of September
1986.

Thus newly discovered evidence was discovered which

justified a new trial.
The trial court made numerous errors in law regarding what
constitutes a "security agreement", "default" and the "right to
repossess".

Thus errors in law took place, justifying a new

trial.
For these reasons the trial court abused in discretion in
not granting a new trial.
CONCLUSION
This court should reverse the trial court and order that the
plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, and the defendant be awarded
his costs and expenses.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1988.

MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
By
Jeff R. Thorne
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
day of August, 1988, I
mailed four (4) copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to
A, W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Plaintiff, 226 North 100 East,
P. 0. Box 171, Logan, Utah 84321.

Jeff R. Thome
Attorney for Defendant
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CROSS ROADS •

TREMONTON. UTAH 84337 •

PHON£-257?lW

May 6, 1987

Carl Baker
460 W 200 No
Hyrum, Utah
84319
Dear Carl,
I talked with the Bankers today and we decided if you would like to have the machinery
which we repossed (IHC Farmal Model 706, Serial #7780SY) and the pair of John Deere
.twin rakes with rake cart (rake model 270 serial #5259246E) you may have them by
simply paying off the balance of our contract with a reasonable rate of interest
at the date of your check.

Sincerely,
Dale Barnes
dba Barnes Equipment
980 W. Main
Tremonton, Utah
CC:

Zions First National Bank
c/o Clain Tanner
First Security Bank
c/o Brent Dickerson
Mann, Hadfield & Thorn
Attorneys at Law
Jack H. Molgard
Attorney at Law
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A. W. Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney for Plaintiff
32S North 100 East
P. 0. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
CARL BAKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DALE BARNES dba BARNES,
EQUIPMENT,
)

Defendant.

This matter

came on

1987, before the Honorable
the court

S7300183CV

for hearing on the 9th day of October,
Robert W.

Daines, Circuit

Judge and

having heard evidence and having examined the file and

exhibits having

been

introduced

into

evidence

and

the court

having examined the same and the court being fully advised of the
premises the court now makes and enters the following;
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Cache County, State of Utah*

2.

Defendant is

a resident

of Box

Elder County,

Sate of

Utah.
3.

The

amount

in

controversy

is

less than $10,000.00

exclusive of costs and interest.
4.
Defendant

That on

or

about

sold

to

the

the

7th

day

Plaintiff "farm
24

of

June,

1986 the

equipment .valued

at

2
$.10,000.00.
5.

Plaintiff

equipment

in

the

made

payment

amount

of

equipment at an agreed price,

to

the

$5,500.00
which

Defendant

by

trading

equipment

had

on

said

in
a

other

value of

$5,500.00.
6.

That a

balance of $4,500.00 remained to be paid by the

Plaintiff to the Defendant.
7.
subject

The Defendant
of

this

surrendered

surrendered possession

transaction

possession

of

to

the

the

of the equipment

Plaintiff

trade

in

and Plaintiff

equipment

to

the

Defendant.
8.

That it

was contemplated by the parties that some time

would elapse prior to Plaintiff paying the balance.
9.

Each

of

the

parties,

Plaintiff

and

Defendant made

efforts to obtain financing in order that the Plaintiff could pay
the balance.
10.
notice

That in
to

the

the month

Plaintiff,

of September

1987, without giving

the Defendant took possession of the

equipment previously sold and delivered to Plaintiff.
11.

The

Plaintiff

equipment attempted

upon

to contact

discovery

of

the

loss

of his

the Defendant, but was unable to

locate him.
12.

The Plaintiff, in need of equipment

a substantial

amount of

time without

purchased from Defendant, bought
equipment taken by Defendant.

25

and after enduring

the use

other equipment

of the equipment
to replace the

3
13.

That Plaintiff

the Spring of

1987

to

equipment but

was told

ultimately contacted
inquire

about

by the

the

the Defendant in

disposition

Defendant that

repossess the equipment and it was

no longer

of the

Defendant had to
available and that

Defendant owed Plaintiff nothing.
14.

Thereafter

a

letter

was

written

by

Defendant to

Plaintiff stating that Plaintiff would be allowed to
equipment upon

payment of

$4,500.00 plus

reclaim the

interest from June of

1986.
15.

Defendant again tendered return

of the

equipment upon

payment of the balance plus interest at the time of trial.
IS.

That Plaintiff refused the offer each time it was made

on the ground that

he

had

replaced

the

equipment

with other

equipment and had no need for the equipment.
17.

That the Defendant unilaterally

18.

That on account of

elected to rescind the

sale.
the unilateral

election to rescind

the Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of $5,500,00.
19.

Upon

payment

by

the

Defendant to the Plaintiff of

$5, 500.00 the parties will be in the same relative position as at
inception of the transaction which is the subject of this action.
From the

foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes and

enters the following;
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That

equipment sold

at

the

to the

time

of

Defendant's

retaking

of the

Plaintiff, the Defendant did not have the
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4
legal right to possession of the equipment.
2.

The rights of possession in this case is controlled by

70A-9-203 UCA as amended.
3.

The Plaintiff

as the

aggrieved party had the right to

treat the wrongful acts of the Defendant in retaking the property
from

the

lawful

possession

of

the

Plaintiff as a unilateral

rescission and to require the Defendant

to once

again place the

Plaintiff in his original position.
4.

That as

the Defendant

the Plaintiff has mitigated his

sold the trade in equipment and
damages

by

replacement

of the

equipment; the most equitable way to place Plaintiff in his prior
position is to award him

judgment

equal

to

the

value

of his

payments to the Defendant.
5.

That the amount required to restore the Plaintiff to his

original position taking into account the use of the equipment by
the Plaintiff

and the deprivation of the use of the equipment on

account of the acts of the Defendant is $5,500.00.
6.

The judgment should bear interest at 12%.

7.

The Plaintiff should have his costs.

DATED this

~7

day of I ^ f e w ,

1987.

Robert W. Daines
Circuit Court Judge
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1
A. W. Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney for Plaintiff
32S North 100 East
P. 0. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-3391
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
BOX ELDER COUNTY, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
CARL BAKER,
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT AND DECREE

vs.
DALE BARNES dba BARNES,
EQUIPMENT,
Defendant.

This matter

87300183CV

came on

for hearing

on the 9th day of October

1987 before the Honorable Robert W. Daines sitting without a jury
and the

issues having

been duly tried and the court having made

it Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff
against

the

Defendant

in

the

judgment to bear interest at 12%

amount

of

and costs

$5, 500.00 with said
to Plaintiff

amount of $53.00.
DATED th:

CIRCUIT JUDGE
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take judgment

in the

Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #3250
Attorneys for Defendant
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P. 0. Box "F"
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906
Telephone 723-3404
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT

CARL BAKER,
Plaintiff,

)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

)

Civil No. 873001S3CV

vs.
DALE BARNES dba BARNES
EQUIPMENT,
Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on the 3rd day of
February, 1988 pursuant to the defendant's Motion for New
Trial.

The court heard the arguments of counsel for the

defendant and counsel for the plaintiff, and the court
having specifically found that the Motion for New Trial was
timely filed for the reason that the original Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree had been
objected to and that no notice of the signings of the
original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
and Decree was given to the defendant until January 8, 1988,
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and the Motion for New Trial was filed with the court on the
18th day of December, 1987.

The court having first found

that the Motion was timely filed, but having considered the
Motion, denies the defendant's Motion for New Trial.
DATED this

>?37 <*ay of February, 1988.

<ODertTW. Darnes
Circuit Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

w

I hereby certify that on the
1988, I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Defendant's Motion for New Trial to A.
Attorney for Plaintiff, P. 0„ Box 171,

day of February,
Order Denying
W. Lauritzen,
Logan, Utah 84321,

n
£<LsrtS?

Q2L
;

Secretary /
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J e f f R. Thome of Mann, H a d f i e l d & Thorne, #3250
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
Zions Bank B u i l d i n g , 98 North Main
P. 0 . Box "F"
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906
Telephone 723-3404
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT

CARL BAKER,
Plaintiff,

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

Civil No. 8 730018 3CV

vs.
DALE BARNES dba BARNES
EQUIPMENT,
Defendant.

Comes now the defendant, Dale Barnes dba Barnes
Equipment, and appeals from the Judgment and Decree entered
on the 7th day of December, 1987, together with the Order
denying the defendant's Motion for New Trial entered on the
25th day of February, 1988.

This appeal is taken from the

First Circuit Court, Box Elder County, Brigham City
Department.
This appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals of the
State of Utah.
DATED this

l*j

day of February, 1988.
Jef'^R/ Thorne""
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF I4AILING
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of February, 19 88
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to A. W.
Lauritzen, Attorney for Plaintiff, P. 0 Box 171, Logan, Utah
84321.

Secre£3?r^ (J

